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Abstract
We consider the problem of bid prediction in repeated auctions and evaluate the
performance of econometric methods for learning agents using a dataset from a
mainstream sponsored search auction marketplace. Sponsored search auctions is
a billion dollar industry and the main source of revenue of several tech giants. A
critical problem in optimizing such marketplaces is understanding how bidders
will react to changes in the auction design. We propose the use of no-regret based
econometrics for bid prediction, modelling players as no-regret learners with re-
spect to a utility function, unknown to the analyst. We apply these methods in a
real-world dataset from the BingAds sponsored search auction marketplace and
show that no-regret econometric methods perform comparable to state-of-the-art
time-series machine learning methods when there is no co-variate shift, but sig-
nificantly out-perform machine learning methods when there is a co-variate shift
between the training and test periods. This portrays the importance of using struc-
tural econometric approaches in predicting how players will respond to changes in
the market. Moreover, we show that among structural econometric methods, ap-
proaches based on no-regret learning out-perform more traditional, equilibrium-
based, econometric methods that assume that players continuously best-respond
to competition.
1 Introduction
Sponsored search auctions are one of the most prominent revenue sources of modern tech giants
and among the most profitable electronic marketplaces. Understanding how to design and optimize
mechanisms for online ad auctions has been the focus of a long line of work at the intersection of
economics and computation, with several streams of research analyzing the design of approximately
optimal simple auctions (Edelman et al., 2007; Caragiannis et al., 2015; Lucier et al., 2012), opti-
mizing reserve prices (Mohri and Medina, 2016), estimation of returns-on-investment (Lewis and
Rao, 2015) and analyzing structural parameters (Athey and Nekipelov, 2010; Syrgkanis et al., 2015).
An important step in optimizing sponsored search marketplaces is the ability to understand how
bidders will respond to market changes or market shocks. One can take a fully unstructured approach
to the bid prediction problem by treating it as a time-series forecasting problem. However, such
approaches can potentially overfit to the current market design or market setting and will not be able
to extrapolate well, when co-variate shifts arise in the data.
Economic and econometric theory can potentially be beneficial for performing such extrapolation
tasks and improve the ability to predict counterfactual behavior. In this paper we perform an empir-
ical evaluation of this statement. The environment that the bidders are facing can be best thought of
as a repeated game-theoretic strategic interaction, where the bids of one player affect the reward of
another. Thereby, learning models of repeated strategic interactions are most appropriate. One can
potentially think of the task as a multi-agent inverse reinforcement learning problem (IRL) (Russell,
1998; Ng and Russell, 2000; Yu et al., 2019). However, the players in a sponsored search auc-
tion are facing a very complex auction design and a dynamically changing strategic environment.
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Therefore classical approaches to multi-agent IRL that typically assume that players form consistent
beliefs can be problematic. Similar problems arise if one uses more classical economic approaches
that assume that the system is at equilibrium (Athey and Nekipelov, 2010; Paarsch et al., 2006), or
variations of equilibrium notions that incorporate bounded rationality (Rong et al., 2016).
An alternative that has received recent attention is modelling players as invoking no-regret learning
algorithms Syrgkanis et al. (2015); Nisan and Noti (2017a,b); Braverman et al. (2018); Alaei et al.
(2019). However, all prior work focused primarily at uncovering structural parameters of the utility
of the bidders, such as the value per click, and did not address the empirical performance of these
methods in terms of their predictive power. In this work we test whether such models of no-regret
learning behavior can have predictive power and out-perform baselines. We note that even though
this theory is making several strong behavioral assumptions on the bidders, we mostly use these
assumptions to impose structure on our estimation approach so as to regularize and extrapolate
better. The ultimate judge is how well these methods perform in terms of prediction. Thus, in the
spirit of George Box’s writings (Box, 1976), even if these theories could be wrong, our goal is to
test whether they could potentially be useful.
Using a large auction dataset from Microsoft’s BingAds sponsored search auction marketplace, we
show that regret-based bid prediction methods perform comparable to machine learning baselines
when there is no co-variate shift, but outperform these baselines in a statistically significant manner
in the presence of a co-variate shift.
2 Bid Prediction in Repeated Ad Auctions
We consider a repeated sponsored search auction setting. At each period t a set of nt bidders
participate in an auction for advertisement slots that will appear alongside the search results triggered
by user queries. We assume that there are nt bidders and m slots and each slot corresponds to a
different probability of receiving a click. Each player i submits a bid bit at each time t and based on
the vector of bids, the auction decides an allocation of the slots and a price that each bidder needs to
pay. For the goal of our analysis, the actual mechanics of the auction are not important and moreover
are too complex to describe, even if proprietary constraints where not at play.
What is important are the following fundamentals. At every period t, we associate two functions that
are sufficient statistics for the strategic reasoning of player i: a probability of click curve xit : R+ →
[0, 1] and a cost-per-click (CPC) curve pit : R+ → R+, which for every bid b return the average
probability of receiving a click and the average cost-per-click for the auctions that occurred during
that period had the player submitted a bid b. In practice, such curves are reported to the bidders
at periodic intervals through revenue optimization feedback tools provided by sponsored search
auction marketplaces. Given that from now on we will be mostly focusing on the perspective of a
single bidder, we will drop the index i. The competition stemming from other bidders is summarized
in the sufficient statistic of the cost and click curves. Our main question is the following:
Given a sequence of bids b1:t for an advertiser, can we forecast the future time series bt+1:T ? More-
over, can we forecast this series when there is a change in the market at time t (a co-variate shift)?
For each of these variants of the question we will consider two forecasting tasks. In the first, we are
asked to produce a future time-series bt+1:T , where the prediction of bid bτ , for τ > t, is performed
solely with knowledge of the bids b1:t and the past cost and click curves x1:t, p1:t, and the cost
and click curves up till time τ − 1, i.e. xt+1:τ−1, pt+1:τ−1.1 In the second, we will consider a
one-step-ahead prediction, where we forecast bτ from bids b1:τ−1 and curves x1:τ−1, p1:τ−1.
3 No-Regret Learning and Structural Econometrics
We will consider a structural econometric approach to the bid prediction task, invoking techniques
from classical auction theory and econometrics in auctions (see e.g. (Paarsch et al., 2006)). Since
most classical econometric theory in auctions tackles static auction settings or imposes very strong
dynamic equilibrium conditions, we will primarily focus on the recent line of work at the intersection
1Typically forecasting cost and click curves is an easier task, since they only depend on aggregate market
statistics, hence for our structural econometric methods we will assume that such forecasts are available.
2
of economics and computer science, that models players as no-regret learners and performs econo-
metrics under such a behavioral assumption (Nekipelov et al., 2015; Nisan and Noti, 2017a,b). In
this section we describe the assumptions that these structural methods are making and how to trans-
fer these assumptions to an estimation and prediction strategy.
In order to understand how bidders will behave in the future in a model-based manner, one needs to
model the objective that the bidders are optimizing and the approach that they use to optimize over
time and handle uncertainty. A standard assumption in auction theory is that players have utility
from each auction that takes the form: ut(b; v) = (v − pt(b))xt(b), i.e. the utility is the expected
number of clicks times the value-per-click (VPC) v minus the expected payment. Thus, the only
parameter that we need to estimate from the data for each player is the value per-click v.
A classical framework in machine learning on repeated decision making in the face of uncertainty is
that of no-regret learning. The no-regret learning framework posits that bidders will choose a bid bt
at each period, such that their regret against submitting any fixed bid in hindsight vanishes to zero
as they play for more and more periods, i.e.:
Regret(u1:T , b1:T ; v) = sup
b
1
T
T∑
t=1
(ut(b; v)− ut(bt; v)) = op(1)
We will adopt the regret framework and assume that bidders use some form of no-regret algorithm
to optimize their bid. We note that contrary to the no-regret framework, traditional econometrics in
auctions typically assumes that players best respond to the competition (i.e. b∗ = argmaxb ut(b; v))
and use this property to identify the value v (see e.g. (Athey and Nekipelov, 2010) for such an econo-
metric approach applied to sponsored search auction data). However, we will see in the empirical
part that such best-response algorithms are out-performed by no-regret based algorithms in terms of
their predictive power.
Since we are not only interested in uncovering structural parameters of the setting, but also in pre-
dicting future behavior, we will consider several classes of no-regret algorithms and fit their param-
eters to data. We will make the assumption that the utility of the player is a concave function of
the bid, which renders the problem that the bidder is facing an online convex optimization problem
(Zinkevich, 2003; Shalev-Shwartz, 2012) in one dimension. Thus we will consider several widely
studied algorithms for this setting. In each of these algorithms we will describe the update rule h(·)
(the next bid of a player as a function of past bids, clicks and cost curves) and provide some context
on where this update rule stems from.
Online Gradient Descent (OGD) (Zinkevich, 2003):
bt+1 = hOGD,η,v(bt, ut) := bt + η∇but(bt; v)
OGD can be thought of as regularized best response with momentum, with respect to the last-period
“linearized” utility u˜t(b; v) = ∇but(bt; v) · (b− bt), i.e.: bt+1 = argmaxb u˜t(b; v)− 12η‖b− bt‖22.
Moreover, it can also be thought of as regularized best response to the past average of linearized
utilities, with shrinkage bias: bt+1 = argmaxb
∑t
τ=1 u˜τ (b; v)− 12η‖b‖22.
Implicit OGD (BR-Reg): bt+1 is defined as the solution to the equation: bt+1 − bt =
η∇but(bt+1; v). This is also referred to as the implicit gradient descent (Toulis and Airoldi, 2017).
This algorithm has the same intepretation as OGD of a regularized best-response with momentum,
but without the linearization of the utility component, i.e. it is equivalent to:
bt+1 = hBRReg,η,v(bt, ut) := argmax
b
ut(b; v)− 1
2η
‖b− bt‖22
FTRL without linearization and with recency bias:
bt+1 = hFTRL,η,v(u1:t) := argmax
b
t∑
τ=1
βt−τuτ (b; v)− 1
2η
‖b‖22
This implies that bt+1 is defined as the solution to the equation: bt+1 = η
∑t
τ=1 β
t−τ∇buτ (bt+1; v).
Recency bias has been analyzed in the context of no-regret algorithms (Fudenberg and Levine, 2014)
and relates to learning in changing environments (Hazan and Seshadhri, 2009; Adamskiy et al.,
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2012) and fast convergence in games (Syrgkanis et al., 2015). We will also refer to the special case
where β = 1 and η = ∞ as the Follow-the-Leader algorithm (FTL), which is also a no-regret
algorithm when the utility functions are strongly concave (see e.g. (Hazan et al., 2007)).2
Algorithm-independent VPC estimation: We will estimate the VPC v of the player solely based
on the no-regret condition and irrespective of the update algorithm. We consider the value estimation
algorithms proposed in (Nekipelov et al., 2015; Nisan and Noti, 2017b). The basic approach one
could take (as described in (Nekipelov et al., 2015)) is to choose the parameter v that achieves
the smallest possible regret level for the player, referred to as the min-regret estimate, i.e.: vmr =
argminv∈V Regret(u1:T , b1:T ; v). A more stable alternative was provided in Nisan and Noti (2017b)
that propose the use of a soft-min version of min regret, referred to as the quantal-regret estimate:
vqr =
∑
v∈V v exp{−λRegret(u1:T , b1:T ; v)}∑
v∈V exp{−λRegret(u1:T , b1:T ; v)}
where V is a set of candidate valuations.3 The authors also provide a Bayesian justification of this
choice as imposing a prior on the space of valuations.
We found empirically that the quantal-regret value estimate is more stable and less sensitive to
estimation errors than the min-regret estimate. Moreover, Figure 1 justifies the use of vqr over vmr
on our data, as it leads to more reasonable predictions on how much players shade their bid (i.e.
what fraction of their value is their bid), and how their valuation varies across days of the week,
if we were to learn a separate value on solely the dataset of each day. Moreover, we find that the
bid difference is positively correlated with the recent gradient of the utility evaluated at the quantal-
regret estimate, as predicted by the OGD algorithm, providing further justification for the use of the
quantal-regret value (see Appendix A).
(a) Estimated value over mean bid (bid shade ratio). (b) Coefficient of variation of daily estimated values.
Figure 1: Comparison of min regret (a & b right) vs. quantal regret (a & b left) value estimates.
Algorithm-specific step-size estimation: All the algorithms that we consider contain a step-size
parameter η that intuitively controls how aggressively the algorithm responds to new evidence. We
will estimate ηˆ of each algorithm from the data by minimizing the mean squared prediction error on
the training set: argminη
1
t
∑t
τ=1(bτ − h(b1:τ−1, u1:τ−1))2, where h is the algorithm update rule.
Since this is a scalar parameter, in the worst-case the optimization requires a grid search. Observe
that for OGD, finding η that minimizes the mean squared prediction error on the training set:
ηˆOGD := argmin
η∈R+
1
T
T∑
t=1
(
bt+1 − hOGD,η,vqr (bt, ut)
)2
:= argmin
η∈R+
1
T
T∑
t=1
(bt+1 − bt − η∇but(bt))2
is equivalent to finding the η from the linear regression of bt+1 − bt on ∇but(bt).4 For the other
algorithms that we consider we perform a grid search to solve the optimization problems.
2It is possible to view the econ counterfactual-curve based algorithms, in which players respond to their
estimates on the other players’ average behavior, as mean-field algorithms Iyer et al. (2014) with no additional
constraints. The most basic example would be the simple best response to the last observed click and cost
curves. We have also evaluated FTL with recency bias, i.e., the special case of FTRL with η =∞ and β = 0.9
that can be viewed as mean field where the beliefs of the players are estimated by the running averages of recent
curves. However, in the paper we present the basic variant of FTL with β = 1 (i.e., with no recency bias) that
achieves better results on our empirical dataset.
3In practice we take V to be a grid of values ranging from 1% of the average bid to 6 times the average bid.
4In practice we enforce positivity of η by returning the absolute value of the unconstrained optimal solution.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2: The Dataset.
4 Data Description
We analyze sponsored-search auction data from the BingAds sponsored search auction marketplace.
The dataset consists of bidding data for 13 high-volume keywords collected in a period of two weeks.
For each bidder, we analyze data that include the bids the player made, the bidder’s cost-per-click
(CPC), the slot and the clicks that the bidder won in each auction, as well as counterfactual data of
CPC and click rates that the bidder could have obtained for different counterfactual bids according
to the competition in the auction. These counterfactual information was generated via the Genie
system (Bayir et al., 2019). For each bidder and auction, the counterfactual data consist of CPC and
probability of click points for counterfactual bids according to 12 different multipliers of the actual
bid the bidder made: (0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 2.0, 5.0).
Typically, bidders participate in multiple auctions every hour, and we aggregate the data by hour for
each bidder. The hourly aggregated bid of a player is the average of bids the player placed during that
hour. The hourly counterfactual data for each bidder is a collection of the 12-point discrete curves
of each of the auctions the player participated during the hour. We aggregate these hourly curves for
each player by fitting the click data points to a concave function of the form axb+x , which gave the
best out-of-sample MSE in a 5-fold cross validation on a validation keyword among the functional
forms we tested (including a linear function, a sigmoid a
1+e−b(x−c) and a convex function ax
2+bx4).
The CPC data points are fitted to a linear function ax to ensure concave utilities. This is of course
a modeling assumption that is put to the test in the prediction performance of the economic models.
The dataset that we analyze consists of data of players who participated in auctions in at least 100
hours and won the top position at least once during the whole two weeks of data. In addition, we
require that the players place only positive bids and have non-zero variance in both their train and
test data (see details on data splitting in Section 5.1).
The full dataset, after the filtering described above, includes data of multiple thousands of bidders5,
with an average of 202.4 active hours per bidder, which aggregate in total a number of auctions of the
order of multiple millions. Figure 2a shows the normalized distribution of hourly-aggregated bids
across all players in the dataset. The bidding levels are diverse and span several orders of magni-
tudes, with, roughly, a power-law distribution, as seen in the logarithmic scale inset. Figure 2b shows
the distribution of sequence lengths across bidders. Figure 2c shows the distribution of coefficient
of variation of bids across bidders. The most frequent bidding behavior is of moderate variability of
around 5% deviation from the average. However, as seen in the median at 12.8%, the majority of
players have high variability bids. The average is as high as 21.2%, due to a non-negligible number
of bidders with extremely high variability, as seen by the power-law tail distribution; see the inset in
logarithmic scale of players with coefficient of variation of above 0.15.
5 Predictive Performance
In this section we evaluate the predictive performance of the prediction methods in a setting in which
the train and test data have similar distributions, which we refer to as the in-sample setting. We
show that in this setting, ML methods do well and that the structured econ OGD method manages
to achieve comparable results. We also observe large differences between BR and the no-regret
5Throughout the paper, we omit sensitive information due to proprietary constraints.
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(a) Series Prediction. (b) Stepahead Prediction. (c) Econ Methods (Series).
Figure 3: Prediction performance in the in-sample setting (red lines denote the median MAPE).
OGD method. In Section 5.4 we evaluate the performance of the methods discussed in Section 3
that interpolate between BR and OGD. The results show that the no-regret interpolating methods
outperform those that are not regret minimizing.
5.1 The In-Sample Prediction Setting
We analyze the dataset described in Section 4. We use one keyword for development and validation
and exclude this keyword from the prediction analysis. The dataset without the validation keyword
consists of 96.2% of the players in the full dataset. For each player we divide the bid sequence and
use the first 90% as training data and the last 10% for test. Training sequence lengths range between
90 and 303 hours with an average of 182.2, and test sequence lengths range between 10 and 33
hours, with an average of 19.7. We evaluate the predictive performance of the methods both in
series prediction, where each model is trained on the training sequence of a player and then remains
fixed for the prediction phase on the entire test sequence, and in a stepahead prediction task, where
the models are re-fitted on the true data at every step and predict only a single step at a time.
5.2 Benchmark Machine-Learning (ML) Methods
We implemented the following ML benchmarks: A linear model which receives input of the two
recent bids (“lag-2 input”); we refer to this model as AR2; As a non-linear benchmark we use a
random forest model with lag-2 input (RF2); As a deep-learning benchmark we use multi-layered
perceptron models with lag-2 input (MLP2); Facebook’s Prophet model Taylor and Letham (2018):
an additive regression model that is designed to produce smooth forecasts of scalar data across time
and to capture long and short term trends, as well as periodic signals, and is a natural state-of-the-art
benchmark for the series bid prediction task. Prophet is trained for each player on the full sequence
of training bids and the corresponding date and hour in day of each bid. See more details on these
ML algorithms in Appendix B.
5.3 ML vs. Structured Econ Methods in the In-Sample Prediction Setting
Here we compare the predictive performance of the structured econ methods and the ML bench-
marks. We evaluate the prediction success by the Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) across
bidders. The MAPE is defined for each bidder i by 1|Testi|
∑
t∈Testi |bit − bˆit|/bit. Percentage error
naturally allows aggregation of errors across bidders with bids of different scale (see Figure 2a).
Figures 3a and 3b show the distributions of performance in the in-sample setting. Overall, the
results show that in this setting, where the train and test sequences come from similar distributions,
the bid-based ML methods indeed do well. OGD manages to achieve comparable results to the ML
algorithms in terms of the main mass of the distributions in both the series and the stepahead tasks,
but has higher error in series prediction in terms of the mean error; this difference is statistically
significant from RF2 and AR2, see Table a in Appendix C.1 for mean errors and confidence intervals.
We also see that BR is significantly inferior to the other methods. Note that BR is depicted only in
the series prediction results; the predictions of BR are the same for the series and the stepahead
prediction settings as they are not a function of the previous bids but of the economic feedback.
Among the ML methods, the top performing methods in the series prediction task (Figure 3a and
Table C.1a), are the non-linear RF2 model and the linear AR2 model. They outperform the state-
of-the-art Prophet, probably due to the relatively small training data, on which the they manage to
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(a) Train-test bid distributions. (b) Average bid in test days.
Figure 4: The co-variate shift dataset.
train more effectively. In the in-sample stepahead prediction task (Figure 3b), all methods except
Prophet perform similarly well, with a median absolute percentage error of less than 5%. Prophet
is less suited for receiving step-by-step input and has the worst performance in this stepahead task.
This disadvantage is statistically significant in terms of the means (see Table C.1b).
In the Appendix we show examples of bid curves and predictions of the OGD and the ML methods in
the series and the stepahead prediction tasks. The series prediction is a hard task since errors may be
accumulated with time. The examples show how Prophet manages to capture the bid dynamics well
even in non-trivial dynamics, and that also OGD usually manages to capture the correct direction of
bid change. The predictions of RF2, MLP2 and AR2 are qualitatively similar, all usually “cut” the
bid curves somewhere close to their average. See Appendix D.1 for more details.
All in all, OGD achieves comparable results to the ML benchmarks, showing that the players’ actions
are consistent with the economic feedback, as is captured by the utility functions estimated from the
data (see Section 4). In Section 6 we show that the structured econ methods that rely on the economic
feedback are particularly useful in a setting where there is a change in the bid distributions.
5.4 BR vs. OGD in the In-Sample Prediction Setting
We have seen that OGD is significantly better than BR. Figure 3c shows the performance of the
methods that interpolate between BR and OGD presented in Section 3. The figure also shows the
Momentum-BR method, which is a direct interpolation between BR and OGD that sets the next
bid to the average between the current bid and the best-reply bid. It can be clearly seen that the no-
regret methods predict closer to the actual bidding data than the methods that do not minimize regret.
FTL, which is a no-regret algorithm for strongly concave utility functions, has higher error than the
classic no-regret learning algorithms. The figure also shows the effect of the two key features that
distinguish between BR and OGD – best reply to the history and regularization – in the performance
of the interpolating methods. The comparison of BR and FTL shows that replying to the entire
history improves the performance compared to the memory-less BR. However the more substantial
improvement is obtained by adding a regularization term, as can be seen in the lower MAPE score
of FTRL and BR-Reg. Among the no-regret methods, the BR-Reg and the computationally-efficient
OGD have the best performance, with an advantage that is statistically significant compared to the
other methods (see Table C.1a).
6 Predictive Performance with a Co-variate Shift
In this section we evaluate the methods in a setting where there is a change in the bid distribution.
Our results show that in this more challenging co-variate shift prediction setting, the structured econ
methods outperform the bid-based ML benchmarks that fail to adapt to the different data.
6.1 The Co-variate Shift Dataset
We wish to evaluate the prediction performance in a setting in which the test bids are significantly
different than the training bids. For this purpose, we subselect days from the data described in
Section 4 (excluding the validation keyword), for which the distribution of bids during the day
7
(a) Series Prediction. (b) Stepahead Prediction. (c) Econ Methods (Series).
Figure 5: Prediction performance in the co-variate shift setting (red lines denote the median MAPE).
(10am to 9pm) is significantly different than the distribution of bids during the night (10pm to 9am),
and use the day bids as the test set. Since the ML benchmarks usually benefit from larger training
data than the 12 data points of a single night, we allow all methods to use all night data of a player
as training. Specifically, to create the co-variate shift dataset, we consider full days with sufficiently
non-trivial activity, i.e. days in which bidders participated in auctions throughout all 24 hours with
a coefficient of variation of bids of at least 0.1. We subselect days where the day bids are different
from all night bids for a player according to a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (with p < 0.001) and apply
a two-sided t-test to confirm that the day bid distribution is not only distinguishable from the train
data but also has a statistically significant higher average (with p < 0.05).
In total, the co-variate shift dataset consists of 762 days for prediction for 260 bidders. The average
number of training hours across bidders is 141.2 with a standard deviation of 29.8. The number of
test hours is 12 for each test day (10am to 9pm), to a total of 12 · 762 = 9, 144 steps for predic-
tion. Figure 4a shows the distributions of train bids (including all night bids for each player in the
dataset) and test bids, both normalized by the average of the training bids for each player. The figure
illustrates that indeed the distribution of test data is different than the training data. Figure 4b shows
the average bid by the hour in day, across all test days in the co-variate shift dataset. The plot shows
the average of test sequences on the right of the vertical line, and their preceding nights on the left,
where each 24-hour sequence is normalized by its average. The shaded area shows the 25 to 75
percentiles for every hour. As can be seen, night bids are on average as low as 85% of the average
bid, and the test bids are on average as high as 115% of the average bid.
6.2 ML vs. Structured Econ Methods with a Co-variate Shift
Figures 5a and 5b show the MAPE distributions of the bid-based ML methods and the structured
econ methods BR and OGD in the co-variate shift setting. Appendix C.2 presents the mean MAPE
across players as well as the confidence bounds. Clearly, the simple and computationally-efficient
OGD achieves the best performance both in the series and in the stepahead prediction tasks. The
bid-based ML methods have a higher error, and even the BR method, that had the worst performance
in the in-sample setting (see Section 5) is now comparable to the ML methods. These results show
that when there is a change in the data, it is better to react to the economic feedback than to the bid
history that is no longer relevant.
In the series prediction task (Figures 5a and C.2a), among the ML methods, Prophet has the best
median error, but still makes large errors for some of the players, as seen by the distribution width.
RF2 has the second-best median, followed by AR2 and MLP2. Note that in this setting the length
of the predicted series is 12, while in the in-sample setting (Section 5) the average predicted series
length is 20, and therefore the error levels are not comparable. In contrast, it is possible to compare
error levels across settings in the stepahead prediction. Figure 5b shows that as could be expected,
in the challenging co-variate prediction setting all methods have higher median errors than in the
in-sample setting. The OGD has the best performance with a median absolute error of 6.4% of the
true bid.
To portray the qualitative difference of the different prediction methods, we present in the Appendix
the prediction curves of the OGD and the ML methods alongside the actual bids, for a sample of
bidders. The plots show how OGD typically matches the new bid level of the test data. In contrast,
the ML methods fail to adapt to the new level of bids and their predictions typically remain close to
the lower bids on which they were trained. See Appendix D.2 for more details.
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Figure 5c shows the performance of the econ methods interpolating between BR and OGD that were
discussed in Section 3. Unlike the results in the in-sample setting (see Section 5.3), in the co-variate
shift setting the separation between no-regret methods and the methods that do not minimize regret
is less clear. However, the results still show that the BR, which does not incorporate any element of
learning, is worse than the other methods that do combine some form of no-regret learning.
7 ML Models with Economic Features
(a) In-sample Prediction Setting. (b) Co-Variate Shift Prediction Setting.
Figure 6: Series prediction performance of the ML methods with economic features (red lines denote
the median MAPE)
We have seen that in the in-sample prediction setting the bid-based ML methods do well, while in
the co-variate shift prediction setting they fail to adapt to the new bid distributions. Here we ask
whether adding economic feedback to the bid-based input of the ML methods can improve their
performance. Specifically, in addition to the two recent predicted6 bids (the “lag-2 input”), the ML
algorithms now receive as input the click and cost curves at the two recent predicted bids, as well as
the gradients of the click and cost curves at the previous predicted bid.
Figure 6 shows the MAPE results in the in-sample and the co-variate shift prediction settings. In the
in-sample setting (Figure 6a), it can be seen that the models with the additional economic features
lead to similar or slightly worse performance than the purely bid-based models. Thus, in this predic-
tion setting, the bid information was a sufficient predictor of future bids and the extra econ features
introduced noise. This is similar to previous results in repeated normal-form games Kolumbus and
Noti (2019). In contrast, Figure 6b shows that in the co-variate shift prediction setting in which the
bids in the training data are different than the test data, the econ features can be useful in augmenting
the ML methods. The most significant utilization of the economic features is achieved by the MLP2
method; MLP2 with economic features (“MLP2Econ”) achieves the best performance among all
ML methods, while the bid-based MLP2 has the worst performance in this setting. Still, the simple
econometric-based OGD that models regret-minimizing players has the best performance. These
results further highlight the importance of structured-economic feedback when there are changes in
the market that lead to changes in bid distributions, and the advantage of simple structured econ
models in this setting.
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APPENDICES
A Hypothesis Testing for OGD
Figure 7: Hypothesis testing related to the OGD algorithm’s plausibility. Distribution across players
of the negative log of p-value of the correlation between bt+1 − bt and∇but(bt; vqr), multiplied by
the sign of correlation. The distribution is shown for the subset of players with average bt+1 − bt of
at least 1 cent across their bid series. We observe that for almost all such players OGD with value
vqr is a plausible model (as most signed p-values are strictly positive).
B Time-Series ML Methods
We implemented the following machine learning (ML) benchmarks:
AR2: A linear model that is implemented using LinearRegression in the python scikit-learn package
Pedregosa et al. (2011). The input to this model at each time step is the two recent bids. In the series
prediction setting the two recent bids are the last two predictions made by the model and in the
stepahead setting the input is the two recent true bids. We call this type of input “lag-2 input.”
RF2: as a non-linear machine learning benchmark we use a random forest model with lag-2 input.
The random forest predictor has 100 trees with a maximum depth of 2, and bootstrap sub-sampling
was used to build each tree. The model is implemented using RandomForestRegressor in the scikit-
learn python package.
MLP2: As a deep-learning benchmark we use multi-layered perceptron models (fully connected
feed-forward neural networks) with lag-2 inputs. The networks have two hidden layers with 128
units in each layer, relu activation function and are optimized using the ADAM optimizer with the
legacy parameters of Kingma and Ba (2014) for 100 epochs, with a batch size of 10 and a learning
rate of 0.0001. The networks are implemented using scikit-learn MLPRegressor. We fitted the
number of hidden layers, the size of each layer, the learning rate, and the number of ephocs on
validation data of a single keyword that is separate from the test data analyzed in the paper.
Prophet: Facebook’s Prophet model Taylor and Letham (2018)7 is a modern additive regression
model for time series forecasting. Prophet is trained for each player on the full sequence of training
bids and the corresponding date and hour in day of each bid. Prophet is especially designed to
produce smooth forecasts of scalar data across time and to capture long and short term trends, as
well as periodic signals, and is a natural state-of-the-art benchmark for the series bid prediction
task. For the stepahead prediction task we re-train Prophet before each prediction with the sequence
of true bids up to the previous timestep and produce a new prediction at each step with the newly
updated model. We implemented Prophet in python using the original source code available by the
authors of Taylor and Letham (2018).
7See also: https://research.fb.com/blog/2017/02/prophet-forecasting-at-scale/.
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C MAPE Results: Means and Confidence Bounds
C.1 The In-Sample Prediction Setting
mean stderr lb ub
RF2 0.104 0.002 0.101 0.108
AR2 0.107 0.002 0.104 0.111
Prophet 0.114 0.002 0.111 0.118
MLP2 0.117 0.002 0.114 0.121
BR-Reg 0.118 0.002 0.115 0.122
OGD 0.120 0.002 0.117 0.124
FTRL 0.152 0.002 0.149 0.156
FTL 0.238 0.002 0.234 0.243
Momentum-BR 0.253 0.002 0.249 0.257
BR 0.274 0.002 0.270 0.279
(a) Series prediction
mean stderr lb ub
MLP2 0.080 0.002 0.077 0.083
AR2 0.080 0.002 0.077 0.083
OGD 0.080 0.002 0.077 0.083
RF2 0.085 0.002 0.081 0.088
Prophet 0.101 0.002 0.098 0.104
(b) Stepahead prediction
Table 1: In-Sample Setting. Mean MAPE score across players, standard error of the mean and 95%
confidence interval, excluding outliers according to the standard method of McGill et al. (1978).
C.2 The Co-Variate Shift Prediction Setting
mean stderr lb ub
OGD 0.165 0.006 0.154 0.177
FTL 0.168 0.007 0.155 0.181
FTRL 0.172 0.006 0.159 0.184
BR-Reg 0.173 0.006 0.161 0.184
Momentum-BR 0.177 0.006 0.164 0.190
Prophet 0.191 0.007 0.178 0.204
BR 0.197 0.006 0.185 0.210
RF2 0.203 0.006 0.190 0.215
AR2 0.221 0.006 0.209 0.233
MLP2 0.226 0.007 0.212 0.241
(a) Series prediction
mean stderr lb ub
OGD 0.086 0.005 0.077 0.095
MLP2 0.092 0.004 0.083 0.100
AR2 0.104 0.005 0.094 0.113
RF2 0.106 0.005 0.097 0.114
Prophet 0.133 0.006 0.122 0.144
(b) Stepahead prediction
Table 2: The Co-Variate Shift Setting. Mean MAPE score across players, standard error of the mean
and 95% confidence interval, excluding outliers according to the standard method of McGill et al.
(1978).
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D Prediction Examples
D.1 Prediction Examples in the In-Sample Prediction Setting
Figures 8 and 9 show examples of bid curves and predictions of the OGD and the ML methods in the
in-sample prediction setting. The series prediction is a hard task since errors of a model are served as
inputs to the next prediction steps and the errors may be accumulated. We see that Prophet manages
to capture the bid dynamics well in most cases. E.g., Figure 8d shows an impressive projection of
Prophet 30 hours to the future in a non-trivial behavior. Also OGD usually manages to capture the
correct direction of bid change. In 8a it is interesting to see that both Prophet and OGD outline
similar curves, not far from the true bids, although the models are very different and are relying
on very different inputs. All models predict relatively smooth curves compared to the large hourly
fluctuations observed in the bidding data. The predictions of the non-linear RF2 and MLP2 and
the linear AR2 are qualitatively similar, all usually “cut” the bid curves somewhere close to their
average. The better MAPE score of RF2 shows that it is usually closer to the average than the
other two methods. Figure 9 shows the stepahead prediction for the same sample of 6 bidders. As
can be seen, in the stepahead prediction task where the models are re-trained in each step with the
true recent bid, the predictions of all models remain closer to the actual bid curve than in the series
prediction task. Also the Prophet model, which is less suited for receiving step-by-step input, seems
to benefit from this input and its predictions only get closer to the true bids with time; e.g. compare
Prophet’s predictions for example f in stepahead (Figure 9) and in series (Figure 8) prediction tasks.
Figure 8: Series predictions in the in-sample setting: Example curves (y-axis removed).
Figure 9: Stepahead predictions in the in-sample setting: Example curves (y-axis removed).
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D.2 Prediction Examples in the Co-variate Shift Prediction Setting
Figures 10 and 11 show examples of bid curves and predictions of the OGD and the ML methods
in the co-variate shift prediction setting. In the series prediction task (Figure 10), the plots show
how OGD typically matches the new bid level of the test data even though it did not see bids from
that bid distribution in the training data. In contrast, the ML methods fail to adapt to the new level
of bids and their predictions typically remain close to the lower bids on which they were trained.
The Prophet model tends to predict periodicity even when it is absent in the true data, possibly due
to Fourier analysis on a relatively small training dataset for each player that may produce noise
artifacts. For example, in 10c, Prophet catches the increasing trend in bids, but still forces a periodic
change. RF2, MLP2, and AR2, that all receive the same input of the 2 previous bids, predict similar
smooth dynamics, though RF2 and MLP2 seem somewhat closer to the higher bid levels of the test
data than the linear AR2 model. Figure 11 shows prediction examples for the same bidders in the
stepahead prediction task. In this more simple prediction task, where the models are re-trained at
each step with the true recent bid, the predictions of all models are closer to the actual bid curve
than in the series prediction task, though still the OGD predictions seem to match the new bid level
better than the ML methods which usually predict lower than the true bid.
Figure 10: Series predictions in the co-variate shift setting: Example curves (y-axis removed).
Figure 11: Stepahead predictions in the co-variate shift setting: Example curves (y-axis removed).
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